In twentieth century Australian criminal law a distinctive departure from the M'Naghten standard rules developed as a critique of the discourse of reasoning and verdicts applying in the relevant English trials from the 1880s. The English verdict of 'guilty but insane' was criticised by the leading jurists as contradictory. And in a sequence of influential judgments the jurist Owen Dixon articulated an approach to the insanity defence that made room for a medico-legal discourse that broadened the possible referents of what it meant to 'know' the legality of an act, as well as acknowledging the complex behavioural factors that might determine an act of homicide. This paper explores the shaping and significance of this departure and its comparative judicial, medical and social contexts. A concluding discussion considers whether the more flexible interpretation of the insanity defence implied by the direction of Dixon's decisions made as much of a difference to frequency of use of the defence as the contemporaneous decline and eventual abolition of capital punishment.
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When Barry J said in 1969 that the defendant must have known a thing sanely he placed himself in a line that went back to James Fitzjames Stephen. In A History of Criminal Law Stephen in 1883 had captured the difficulty of the Rules precisely.
The word 'wrong' is ambiguous as well as the word 'know'. It may mean either 'illegal ' or 'morally wrong', for there may be such a thing as illegality not involving moral guilt, and when we come to deal with madness, the question whether 'wrong' means 'morally wrong', or only 'illegal', may be important.
The example he went on to develop was that of Hadfield, the attempted assassin of George III, whose 'knowledge of the illegality of his act was the very reason why he did it'. Yet was there any doubt but that Hadfield held the kind of delusion that prevented him from exercising 'an act of calm judgment in the character of the act'?
And just because Hadfield knew an act was illegal could it really be said that he knew such an act was wrong?
For Stephen there was no question of what meaning the word 'wrong' had to bear when dealt with in the context of a criminal law charge. 'There is no offence', he went on, 'in answer to a charge of which madness is likely to be set up as a defence, as to the moral character of which any question can arise…A person who disbelieved in all moral distinctions, and had ridded himself of all conscience, would know that murder is wrong'. Given this natural law understanding then the key question became one relating to the capacity of insane persons to control their conduct. A narrow interpretation of the M'Naghten Rules would limit the insanity defence to a question of madness 'regarded merely as a possible cause of innocent mistakes as to matter of fact and matters of common knowledge'. Wedding himself to what he characterised as a wider interpretation Stephen became the advocate of a law 'that no act is a crime if the person who does it is at the time when it is done prevented either by defective mental power or by any disease affecting his mind from controlling his own conduct' (Stephen, 1883: 167-8) . The attempt was fruitless, though he considered that judicial interpretation of the Rules on the wider lines he had suggested might avoid the need for the kind of legislative provision that he drew up in 1878. 'Knowledge that an act is wrong' might be the best test of responsibility if the words were construed within the understanding he posited, namely that 'it is as true that a man who cannot control Manuscript of Finnane: Irresistible impulse -History of Psychiatry, vol. 23, 4, (2012) : 454-68 8 himself does not know the nature of his acts as that a man who does not know the nature of his acts is incapable of self-control' (Stephen, 1883: 171).
As much as Stephen's views on these matters struggled to find acceptance among the judges of his own country (for so many of whom the role of the law was to insist on the restraint of impulse, not to find excuses for failure to control passions 3 ) their influence on others was enduring. And by way of the imperial circuitry of appeal courts in the old Empire and the succeeding Commonwealth, the broader view eventually worked its way back into the law of England. To see how this happened, we must consider the judicial opinions and extra-judicial writing of Owen Dixon of the High Court of Australia.
Dixon and 'the impossible legacy'
For Dixon the English laws that Australia inherited and had to work with were profoundly unhelpful in the matter of insanity and crime. The legacy that he discussed in a 1957 lecture on this 'discreditable chapter of the law', was one which had 'gone astray' in three respects in the nineteenth century. The first step, the decision taken after the Hadfield case to add a rider to a verdict of acquittal specifying that it was on the grounds of insanity, confused the functions of criminal law and lunacy administration. Second, the M'Naghten Rules had imprisoned the 'common law in a formula ... [and] had deprived the common law not only of its capacity for development, but even of its accustomed flexibility of application'. In the third stage, the trial of Maclean for the attempted assassination of Queen Victoria had led to the Trial of Lunatics Act of 1883, with its seemingly contradictory requirement of the verdict 'guilty but insane'. As Dixon commented on this last development, 'a prisoner who at his trial hears a verdict of guilty but insane pronounced may be forgiven if he fails to recognise that he has been acquitted' (Dixon, 1965: 224, 218 An appeal to the South Australian Supreme Court was unsuccessful, but in the High Court Brown won a reprieve. The core of the decision, written by Dixon, was that the trial judge had erred when he told the jury in summing up that if they felt that Brown had been acting under an uncontrollable impulse then that was no defence in law and they should find him guilty. Dixon rebutted this reasoning -'to treat his domination by an uncontrollable impulse as reason for a conclusion against his defence against shifts, and the way in which they allowed medical evidence to find a way into the court, it is necessary to go back to his earlier judgments, especially the definitive Sodeman (1936) and Stapleton (1952).
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Dixon and M'Naghten
The distinctiveness of the Australian approach was centred on Dixon's reasoning in three cases. We have already noted his later (1957) view of the M'Naghten rules which he considered had imprisoned the common law in a formula, blocking its capacity for development. Some indication of the way in which he might approach an insanity defence early in his career on the High Court was evident in his participation in a 1932 discussion on the plea of insanity. At one of the early meetings of the Medico-Legal Society, a Melbourne psychiatrist Reg Ellery 9 presented a paper on the plea of insanity, arguing for a wholesale reform of the law's approach that would result in the replacement of retributive punishments and selective exculpation of offenders able to mount an insanity defence by a system of treatment under a regime of compulsory psychiatric examination of all offenders.
In discussion Owen Dixon (appointed to the High Court in 1929) was the first to comment and did so at some length. He avoided comment on the policy issues raised by Ellery's proposal, choosing instead to comment on the resistance to adaptation of the law that had resulted from the M'Naghten heritage, as it had been interpreted by the English Court of Criminal Appeal. In ways that he would follow in some of the judgments we discuss below Dixon in 1932 argued that the flexibility of the common law had been reduced by the M'Naghten Rules to a 'formula', a 'formula which has proved incapable of adaptation to widening knowledge and changed conceptions of mental phenomena.' In a brief account of the judicial history of the Rules he went on to argue that 'modern Judges' had in fact not initially treated the Rules as such a formula but that the legal principle [of the insanity defence] retained sufficient vitality of its own to enable them to apply it to conduct which the prisoner was without any capacity to control or direct. A formidable number of Judges, sitting alone, had given considered rulings which departed from the Macnaughton formula.
But unfortunately, the English Court of Criminal Appeal in 1926 finally declared that such departures were inadmissible.
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To emphasise the point Dixon suggested that far from lagging behind medical thought, lawyers before M'Naghten had been in advance of community sentiment. It was the English Court of Criminal Appeal which had restrained recent 'judicial tendencies towards a more rational and liberal rule', by an approach 'which rightly or In the first of these Dixon was in the unusual role, for him, of being the trial judge.
Although a judge of the High Court, he was sitting in the Court's original jurisdiction (under which the Court still heard criminal matters in the Australian Capital Territory) in a matter involving the trial of a man for murdering his 11 month-old son. After a period of protracted conflict with his wife, including a period of separation, Bertram
Porter had administered the poison strychnine to his son, of whom he had care, after threatening he would kill himself and the infant. Porter entered a defence on the grounds of insanity and medical evidence was heard. In directing the jury Dixon set out the matters with a clarity that was of enduring influence, the direction still being reprinted in criminal law casebooks in the United States as well as Australia (Bronitt and McSherry, 2001; Fisse and Howard, 1990; Kadish and Schulhofer, 2001 ). Dixon first drew the jury's attention to the rationale for the insanity defence -what was the 'utility of punishing people if they be beyond the control of the law for reasons of mental health?' He emphasised that the defence was nevertheless to be contained to those who were something other than simply abnormal, of 'peculiar' disposition or 'peculiarly tempered'. The deterrent value of the criminal law Dixon stressed should not be undermined by a loosening of the bonds of responsibility. For that reason it was essential to be clear about what was the 'standard of mental disorder' to be applied by a jury in assessing an insanity defence -this was distinguished by Dixon from the questions that the medical profession faced, or even those charged with the administration of lunacy.
In developing the standard to be considered by the jury Dixon went on to outline the standard requirements of the M'Naghten rules. The jury was required to make a judgment about the condition of the mind at the time of the act; and for an insanity defence to be proved the 'state of mind must have been one of disease, disorder or disturbance', one that affected the understanding, rather than requiring a demonstrable change in the brain or 'physical constitution of the mind'. It was however in elaborating two key words in the M'Naghten rules that Dixon sought to refine the interpretation in ways that would shape later views. In assessing whether the defendant 'knew that what he was doing was wrong', the jury had to consider not 'right or wrong in the abstract' -but the meanings of these terms in the specific circumstances of the killing of an individual. was a wrong act to commit in the sense that ordinary reasonable men understand right and wrong and that he was disabled from considering with some degree of composure and reason what he was doing and its wrongness,' the jury should find him not guilty on the grounds of insanity.
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The relative clarity of Dixon's direction no doubt lent it the kind of authority that saw it become the standard reference point for directions to the jury in insanity defence cases. Barry played a key role in giving the direction wider circulation -the charge to the jury was published in 1935 in the first volume of Proceedings of the Medico-Legal Society of Victoria, under Barry's editorship; and the following year he drew it to the attention of defence counsel in the Sodeman case (Bourke and Sonenberg, 1969: 80; Waller, 1977: 178) . Via that route the charge made it into the law books more generally. In 1943, while not yet a judge, Barry noted its significance as a 'model for judges who have to perform the task …of directing juries intelligently upon the defence of insanity' (Barry, 1943) . Subsequently, as a judge, he readily turned to
Porter to guide his own practice. One of his early unreported judgements was often later cited along with Porter, in support of the proposition that 'disease of the mind'
was not limited to physical evidence of deterioration but must stop short of being a 'mere idiosyncrasy, such as bad temper'.
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The grounding of Dixon's understanding of 'wrong' in a way that linked it more to
Stephen's than to narrower Privy Council interpretations became clearer in two cases which were heard on appeal in the High Court of Australia, one of them proceeding Psychiatry, vol. 23, 4, (2012): 454-68 20 decrease following the abolition of capital punishment' the year before. Two decades later it was possible to review the impact; Freiberg then confirmed his earlier suspicion that there was a very considerable decline in the use of the insanity defence following the abolition of capital punishment (Freiberg, 1976 (Freiberg, , 1994 and offending into the arena of dispositions and appropriate treatment, to consider whether they missed the positive protection afforded by the insanity defence (with its consequences of lengthy incarceration) to those who were free of the burden of mental illness. What consequences, he wanted to know, would follow from making potentially all who crossed the courtroom or police station threshold the subjects of invasive and indeterminate treatment? (Kadish, 1968: 273-90; Morris, 1967) In any case such arguments remained only remotely connected to what faced real defendants in courtrooms. There the fate of those few who advanced the insanity defence continued to be subject to all the uncertainties opened up the House of Lords in 1843. This article has shown that attempts to nail down those ambiguities could result in quite disparate approaches in different jurisdictions, even in the one country.
Interacting with other factors (not least in Australia the assertive independence of English authority entertained by Dixon), the impact of medicine and science in judicial thinking, seen by many medical professionals after 1843 as too little or too poorly understood, can instead be seen as shaping in much more subtle ways the emerging distinctions the judges sought to make in interpreting what the Rules meant.
Manuscript of Finnane: Irresistible impulse -History of Psychiatry, vol. 23, 4, (2012): 454-68 21 Even as he repeated his commitment to basal principle, Justice Dixon of the High Court of Australia loosened the ties of principle to accommodate the extra-legal thinking that bore on matters before the court. When he insisted that wrong meant something more than legally wrong, he confessed that the law couldn't always get it right -and affirmed that on some matters, juries and common-sense notions had to guide outcomes. Even before it became possible to determine exactly why a person's disordered mind made it impossible to control an impulse to commit a violent crime, Dixon insisted that the wrongness of an action had also to mean something more than merely being wrong according to law. An openness to the persuasive evidence of medical science assisted such a change in judicial thinking -although that was different from medicine being hegemonic in the court-room. The readiness of the Australian High Court to move away from the constraints of English judicial authority, during decades when this possibility was slowly developing, facilitated the adoption of a notion that irrepressible or uncontrollable impulse might be a factor demanding attention in a defence against a charge of homicide. Stapleton, the Canadian courts had gone both ways in their decisions until Schwarz; a similar split was evident in the United States around the same matter (Colvin, 1981) . 
